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The paper analyses the effectiveness of the current Croatian regionalfiscal policy in terms of its potential
effects on stimulating economic growth in the war-affected regions. It is investigated whether sector
(production vs. services), firm size, and the after-tax profit affect the investment behaviour in terms of the
profit share re-investment. We estimate single and multigroup structural equation models treatingfirm size
and re-investment behaviour as latent variables. The result suggest significant differences between
production and service sector firms, and also some differences between firms of different sizes in respect to
their re-investment tendencies. Namely, we find the relationship between the latent size normalised to net
profit and re-investment share most pronounced among small and medium production firms, while such
effect was not found for service sector and large firms. The results suggest that the enterprise size and
sector do affect profit-share re-investment and that a more efficient fiscal policy could be designed by
differently treating firms of different sectors and sizes.
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1. Introduction
Croatian economy is characterised by unequal
regional economic development. The underdeveloped
regions are mainly those that were shattered in the war
and are thus considered ''war-affected''. While deve-
lopment of coastal and north-western regions is taking
off, the lagging regions show considerable difficulties
in catching up. The areas shattered in the war entered
transition period later then other regions and from a
lower initial development level.
One of the policy measures taken by the central
government with the aim of stimulating economic
growth and development of the war-affected regions is
a simple form of regional fiscal policy based on
general profit-tax reductions for business entities from
these regions. The key assumption behind this policy
is that general regional profit-tax reductions will result
in higher rate of investment in the lower-tax regions
and thus stimulate convergence in regional develop-
ment level. Subsequently, it is expected that such
* Correspondence: Department of Statistics, London School of
Economics, Houghton Street WC2A 2AE, London
policy will bring up the formerly war-affected and un-
derdeveloped regions to the level of the other regions.
However, there is a lack of analytical studies that
can back up either of these two assumptions, so the
currently implemented policy is not 'research-based'
and thus its expected outcomes are rather uncertain. In
the case of slow convergence in regional growth rate
regional fiscal policy might be a reasonable choice.
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether regional pro-
fit-tax reductions will achieve the policy aim which is
accelerated growth of the war-affected regions, or
whether different or more elaborate policy might be
needed.
An alternative, for example, might be to imple-
ment a more elaborate fiscal policy that would allow
different sector and firm-type treatment (e.g., prefere-
ntials for start-ups), refined regional differentiation
based on detailed regional development assessment
and imposition of tax reductions on reinvested profit
share. Such policy would be more complex and more
difficult to implement thus requiring detailed
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analytical background studies of the effects and likely
consequences of alternative fiscal measures.
This paper analyses the effectiveness of the cur-
rent Croatian regional fiscal policy in terms of its po-
tential effects on stimulating economic growth in the
war-affected regions.
It is investigated whether sector (production vs.
services), firm size, and the after-tax profit affect the
investment behaviour in terms of the profit share re-
investment. If the enterprise size and sector affect pro-
fit-share re-investment, then an efficient fiscal policy
should differently treat firms of various sizes and
sectors.
2. Regional fiscal policy:
Theoretical background
The issue of using fiscal policy to foster regional
development and thus bridge regional development
gaps has been long present in the economic literature.
Since lower national unemployment rates tend to be
linked to higher inflation rates "policies to reduce the
regional variability of unemployment should lead,
ceteris paribus, to higher rates of inflation" (Hewings,
1978:258).
An important input for designing regional fiscal
policy (as well as evaluating the appropriateness of the
already implemented policies) concerns the effects of
regional fiscal policy on regional income and employ-
ment. How much will the regional income increase per
each currency unite of regional investment? This
question was addressed already by Archibald (1967)
who argued that in the United Kingdom" ... the change
in a region's income due to one pound of Treasury
expenditure of the public works type is in all proba-
bility less then one pound" (p. 22).
Fiscal policy instruments, such as tax incentives,
aimed at decreasing regional disparities are essentially
means of expanding aggregate demand because tax
incentives for investment merely concentrate additi-
onal demand in the capital goods sector (Kesselman, et
al. 1977). Early examples of fiscal instruments
through which the government aims to achieve a
leftward shift in the Phillips curve include the selective
employment tax (SET) and the regional employment
tax (REn introduced in the United Kingdom in the
sixties. The SET and RET were distributed per man
employed and thus taxed the factor labour. Hutton and
Hartley (1968) proposed a regional payroll tax that is a
function of the target national unemployment rate and
the local unemployment rate, as an alternative to the
above two tax forms.
Starting from the assumption that the objective
of a regional policy includes a reduction in the regional
differentials in unemployment rates, an increase in
activity rates in the high unemployment areas, a
decrease in migration from the underdeveloped areas,
and a reduction in the excess demand for labour in the
developed regions, Hutton and Hartley (1968: 418)
outlined the following criteria a regional fiscal policy
should satisfy:
(i)The tax must reduce unemployment rates in
the underdeveloped areas;
(ii)The tax must reduce the excess demand for
labour in the developed areas;
(iii)The tax needs to be related to both regional
and national unemployment rates;
(iv)The tax system should be the least-cost
method of achieving policy objectives
The main policy choice in respect to tax re-
ductions is the criteria for awarding tax credits (i.e. re-
duction). Two general approaches are present in
practice and are broadly discussed in the literature-
investment tax and employment tax credits. Generally,
both tax forms aim to affect the price of labour and
thus stabilise the economy.
Analogous to employment tax credits in the
policy practice two other terms with the same meaning
are in use, "employment subsidies" and "wage sub-
sidies". In practice, wage-subsidies proved to be more
efficient then capital or output subsidisation and also
superior to tariff protection. Subsidisation of wages is
generally used in policies aimed at fostering develop-
ment of underdeveloped areas; particular urban sec-
tors of a developed country; income maintenance; and
job training oflow-wage workers. Tax variants such as
regional employment premiums or selective employ-
ment tax provide labour incentives by location and
industry, respectively. Regional employment tax cre-
dits provide tax reductions to firms that are increasing
employment levels.
Employment tax credit policy might provide tax
reduction equivalent to a specified amount of per
manhour employed, where subsidy rates on man-hours
or wage bill is treated directly, rather then through the
tax-credit rule (see Kesselman, et al. 1977). It can be
expected that such employment tax credit policy would
lower the price oflabour to the firms and also lower the
price of unskilled labour relative to the price of the
skilled labour. Alternatively, employment tax credit can
be equal to a specified percentage of wage bill of the
firm, which could be administered through the reported
tax return or social insurance data (e.g. through re-
ductions in the social security contributions which
employers are obliged to pay for each employee).
A "marginal" employment tax credit is a related
measure that potentially might achieve greater em-
ployment increase by reducing taxes of the firms on the
grounds of their contribution to increasing em-
ployment. The employment tax credit and marginal
employment tax credit both subsidise new purchases of
the subsidised input, hence investment flow beco-mes
analogous to marginal (i.e. additional) employ-ment by
the firm. This can be more efficient then investment-
based incentives if the firms adjust their labour inputs
faster then their capital inputs.
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Table 1
AI fi al liciternative ISC po Cles
Policy measure Assumptions Policy implications
Profit-tax reductions • Higher after-tax profit will • If Firms re-invest after-tax profit
stimulate investment through then tax cuts will stimulate
larger overall profit re- investment
investment
• Investment positively affects
growth
Employmenttax credit: • Firms adjust their labour inputs • Employment tax credits will be more
• Tax reduction on the faster then capital inputs efficient then investment tax credits
basis of man-hours • The average cost net of the of equal cost only if distributional
employed credits is lower under the effects arise
• Tax reduction on the employment tax credit policy • Increase in employmentresulting
basis of the percentage • Output is responsive to prices from employment tax policy alone
of wage bill of the firm will be small if output is unchanged
Marginal employment tax • Firm's employmentwithout • Marginal employment tax credits
credit employment tax credit policy is will be more efficient then
lower then the base investment tax credits of equal cost
employmentmagnitude only if distributional effects arise
Investment tax credit • Firms adjust their capital • Investment tax credits are preferred
inputs faster then labour inputs when distribution effects are unlikely
• Output is unresponsive to to be present
prices
Theoretically, if the firms are assumed to be cost
minimising and facing perfectly elastic input supplies,
an exogenous change in effective input prices will
stimulate the firm to chose a new cost-minimising mix
of inputs for the given output. This implies that the
average cost net of the credits must be lower in the
presence of an employment tax credits, however in case
of marginal employment tax credits firms will find it
beneficial only if its employment without the available
credit would have exceeded its current base or if its
employment without the credit would have been less
then the base. Contrary, if the base is sufficiently large,
the firm will not find marginal employment tax credit
beneficial.
Additionally, the tax credit policy has potential
implications for inflation through changes in the
average price of output. It is likely that employment tax
credit and marginal employment tax credit policies will
have a negative effect on inflation through reducing
output price.
3. The data
We collected firm-level data for a random sample
of 400 firms selected using sectoral and firm-size
stratification. Fiscal variable (see Table 2) such as
operating profit and turnover, and firm-characteristics
variable such as firm size, age, number of employees
and sector were obtained from the Croatian Financial
Agency (FINA). Additionally, data on profit re-invest-
ment tendencies were collected through an auxiliary
survey conducted on the same sample obtained from
FINA. Since questions on profit-share re-investment
preferences and similar information are not particularly
sensitive, a higher response rate was expected targeting
for a final sample size between 200 and 300 firms. The
final sample size included 236 firms, hence the respon-
se rate in the auxiliary survey was 59%. Table 3 shows
the breakdown of the sample in regards to size and
sector. The apparent over-representation of the small
firms actually confums with the distribution of firm
size in the Croatian economy where 96% of all business
entities are small and medium enterprises. The larger
share of the service sector firms is also characteristic for
the population of Croatian firms, where production
firms are dominated by the service sector firms.
The size breakdown used in Table 3 was based on
the legal classification of business entities, which was
defined by the Croatian Law on Accountancy that clas-
sifies firms into 'small', 'medium', and 'large' according
to criteria such as profit balance upon deduction of lo-
sses; profit during 12 months before balance sheet pre-












Investment in physical assets*
Investment in R&D*
* As share of the net profit.
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Table 3
Distribution of firms in the sample according to size and sector
All sectors Production sector Service sector
All firms 236 97 139
Large firms 23 16 7
Medium firms 45 27 18
Small firms 168 54 114
Table 4
Correlation matrix (full sample, N = 236)








9 1 -0.14 1.00
Xs 0.6 0.8 1.0
8 4 0.57 0.14 0
X6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0
3 5 0.48 0.34 6 0
YI 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.0
5 4 0.21 -0.08 5 6 0
Y2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.0
4 1 0.12 -0.02 8 9 4 0
Y3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.7 1.0
9 7 0.11 -0.08 1 1 3 8 0
Table 5
Correlation matrix, all firms production and service sectors
Production sector (N = 97)
Xl X2 X3 X4 Xs X6 YI Y2 Y3
Xl 1.00
X2 0.87 1.00
X3 0.41 0.95 1.00
X4 0.31 0.43 -0.12 1.00
Xs 0.57 0.87 0.52 0.12 1.00
X6 0.71 0.72 0.43 0.32 0.81 1.00
YI 0.17 0.28 0.23 -0.01 0.07 0.26 1.00
Y2 0.36 0.24 0.17 -0.05 0.25 0.29 0.86 1.00
Y3 0.21 0.18 0.13 -0.04 0.37 0.21 0.95 0.83 1.00
Service sector (N = 139)
Xl X2 X3 X4 Xs X6 YI Y2 Y3
Xl 1.00
X2 0.77 1.00
X3 0.38 0.89 1.00
X4 0.33 0.45 -0.13 1.00
Xs 0.62 0.79 0.57 0.14 1.00
X6 0.74 0.75 0.38 0.27 0.83 1.00
YI 0.11 0.28 0.26 -0.04 0.03 0.17 1.00
Y2 0.16 0.1 0.05 -0.03 0.16 0.12 0.63 1.00
Y3 0.09 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.21 0.14 0.76 0.57 1.00
U
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Table 4 shows the correlation matrix for the full jointly with the structural part, though straightforward
sample, while correlation matrices for sub-samples of to implement within the linear structural equation
production and service sector firms are shown in Table modelling framework (see e.g. Cziraky (2004a;b),
5. Table 6 gives correlation matrices for sub-samples of Cziraky et al. (2003a,b,c), Cziraky et al. (2003a,b,c)) is
small, medium, and large firms, and Table 7 shows the rather innovative in this type of research. The usual
small firms sub-sample split into production and service alternative is the simple multiple regression (estimated
sector firms. with OLS) where each type of expenditure, investment,
etc. is included as a separate regressor. There are two
4. Econometric methodology problems with this approach. First is purely technical
and points to likely multicolinearity among such
The research problem is be forrnalised as a stru- regressors. Second, from the substantive side, we do not
ctural equation model with latent variables. The model consider modelled variables as perfectly measured and
consists of two parts: the measurement model and the we wish to operate with behavioural concepts and focus
structural equation model. Inclusion of the measure- on the underlying concepts affecting entrepreneurial
ment model (an analogue to factor analytic models) investment behaviour.
Table 6
Correlation matrix: large, medium, and small ftrms
Large firms (N = 46)
Xl X2 X3 X4 Xs X6 Yl Y2 13
Xl 1.00
X2 0.69 1.00
X3 0.34 0.89 1.00
X4 0.37 0.55 -0.13 1.00
Xs 0.62 0.79 0.57 0.24 1.00
X6 0.74 0.75 0.38 0.29 0.58 1.00
Yl 0.1 0.18 0.17 -0.02 0.02 0.19 1.00
Y2 0.11 0.09 0.12 -0.06 0.1 0.14 0.67 1.00
Y3 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.13 0.11 0.73 0.67 1.00
Medium firms (N = 90)
Xl X2 X3 X4 Xs X6 YI Y2 Y3
Xl 1.00
X2 0.68 1.00
X3 0.39 0.91 1.00
X4 0.37 0.46 -0.13 1.00
Xs 0.64 0.79 0.52 0.32 1.00
X6 0.73 0.62 0.33 0.32 0.81 1.00
Yl 0.55 0.29 0.39 -0.16 0.39 0.48 1.00
Y2 0.43 0.56 0.38 -0.18 0.64 0.67 0.76 1.00
Y3 0.47 0.48 0.39 -0.09 0.57 0.48 0.75 0.63 1.00
Small firms (N = 136)
Xl X2 X3 X4 Xs X6 YI Y2 Y3
Xl 1.00
X2 0.78 1.00
X3 0.43 0.94 1.00
X4 0.53 0.51 -0.15 1.00
Xs 0.67 0.75 0.53 0.36 1.00
X6 0.74 0.64 0.37 0.3 0.84 1.00
Yl 0.35 0.19 0.34 -0.06 0.37 0.28 1.00
Y2 0.24 0.38 0.29 -0.04 0.45 0.42 0.73 1.00
Y3 0.27 0.26 0.14 -0.1 0.34 0.36 0.71 0.83 1.00
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Table 7
Correlation matrix: production and service sector small firms
Production sector (N = 54)
Xl X2 X3 X4 Xs X6 YI Y2 Y3
Xl 1.00
X2 0.83 1.00
X3 0.57 0.87 1.00
X4 0.45 0.52 -0.17 1.00
Xs 0.63 0.76 0.64 0.24 1.00
X6 0.79 0.77 0.59 0.42 0.87 1.00
YI 0.43 0.49 0.64 -0.21 0.17 0.43 1.00
Y2 0.53 0.36 0.42 -0.19 0.47 0.57 0.89 1.00
Y3 0.47 0.37 0.29 -0.17 0.52 0.45 0.92 0.78 1.00
Service sector (N = 114)
Xl X2 X3 X4 Xs X6 YI Y2 Y3
Xl 1.00
X2 0.42 1.00
X3 0.34 0.68 1.00
X4 0.68 0.52 -0.21 1.00
Xs 0.68 0.74 0.57 0.33 1.00
X6 0.71 0.56 0.41 0.26 0.62 1.00
YI 0.21 0.27 0.42 -0.08 0.17 0.13 1.00
Y2 0.18 0.33 0.18 -0.07 0.28 0.17 0.58 1.00
Y3 0.12 0.17 0.21 -0.06 0.26 0.31 0.67 0.71 1.00
The modelling framework will thus incorporates
measurement models for underlying latent concepts
and two such models are defined, These are the firm-
size model and the investment model.
Investment model. Although total investment of
an enterprise can be treated as a "defined" concept that
adds all types of investments, we propose to introduce
a methodological refinement by treating it as imper-
fectly measured or indirectly observed. Such an ap-
proach assumes "investment" to be a behavioural con-
cept where total investment denotes efforts or concrete
steps or actions of an entrepreneur. This approach is
novel and its application not only appears to be increa-
singly popular in general consumption and investment
research but is also particularly attractive in the 5MB
field where there are potentially large differences
among business entities in the type and magnitude of
particular investment categories. The latent invest-
ment variable is measured by three observed indica-
tors, investment in education (YJ, investment in physi-
cal assets (Yl)' and investment in R&D (y3)'
Enterprise size model. What is enterprise size?
Relying on legal definitions of size and using two or
three categories, such as small, medium and large,
usually skips this question. However, relying on such
non-economic concepts that do not correspond to
economic reality and actual "business size" of a firm at
best uses imperfect proxies and, at worst, fails to
capture the essence of the problem. Furthermore, legal
definitions are far from ambiguous because they allow
alternative classifications of "either-or" type, i.e., ente-
rprises are ranked small, medium or large if they either
have certain number of employees or annual turnover
above some specified level, and some definitions even
rely on total assets and market value of the firm. From
the methodological point of view, such classifications,
even if valid, are not useful in our model.
Namely, which indicator of size should we inclu-
de? As we no longer operate with legal classifications,
but true economic relationships, should we include
variables such as the number of employees, annual
turnover, or firms' assets, thus likely cause multi coli-
nearity and get ambiguous results? As an alternative
we propose to measure "size" of an enterprise as latent
category that is imperfectly measured with several
"size-indicators" such as those mentioned above. This
way we could operate with a true latent concept and
directly include it into the model subsequently estima-
ting its effect on other variables and investment beha-
viour. Specifically, we presume the latent enterprise
size can be measured by the following observable
indicators: number of employees (x)), annual turnover
(Xl)' annual profit (x3), total commitments (x4), total
expenditures (x4), and total assets (xs)'
The basic model is of general structural equation
(SEM) form with the structural part given by = B + +
and the measurement part given by y = y + (for latent
endogenous variables) and x = x + (for latent exoge-
nous variables). Table 8 explains the used symbols and
notation. We wish to develop measurement models for
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We formulate the following null hypothesis:the two latent variables size of the enterprise (mea-
sured by XI' Xl' Xj' X4, andx.), and investment (measured
bYYI>Yl' andyj),
We use a linear multivariate statistical model
specified as a special case of the general structural
equation model with latent variables. In matrix nota-
tion, the model can be written in three parts; the
measurement model for latent exogenous variables is
given by
the measurement model for latent endogenous
variables is
(2) Y = AyTt +E. (2)
Finally, the structural part of the model is given by
where Ax, Ay, B and I' are the coefficient matrices
and c5, E and ( are latent errors. Under the assump-
tion of multivariate Gaussian distribution of the obser-
ved variables the model coefficients, given the model is
identified, could be jointly estimated by minimising the
multivariate Gaussian (log) likelihood function
(4) FML = InII:.I+ tr ~I:.-1 }-In 181- (p + q),
where S denotes empirical covariance matrix
(computed directly from data),p and q are numbers of
observed endogenous and exogenous variables,
respectively, and L is the model-implied covariance
matrix given by
1:=(Ay(I-Br'(Dllr +'I')[(I-Br't A~+0. Ay(I-Br'DI>A:+~)
~cprT[(I-Br't AT +0£6 ~CII~ +06
(5) y
Ho,: The enterprise size has no effect on invest-
ment behaviour.
Hoz: The sectoral belonging has no effect on in-
vestment behaviour; firms from production and ser-
vice sectors have equal propensity to re-invest.
H03: The sectoral belonging has no effect on
investment behaviour of small firms; small firms from
production and service sectors have equal propensity
to re-invest.
5. Empirical analysis
The model is specified as a special case ofEqs.
(1-3). The exogenous measurement model is
specified with two latent variables, each nonnalised













and the endogenous measurement model is specified
with a similar nonnalisation as
The structural equation model (Eq. 3) is speci-
fied as a non-recursive multivariate regression model
with weakly exogenous regressors in the form
Table 8












Vector of latent endogenous variables
Matrix of coefficients of the latent endogenous variables
Matrix of coefficients of the latent exogenous variables
Vector of latent exogenous variables
Observed indicators of the latent endogenous variables
Observed indicators of the latent exogenous variables
Matrix of coefficients for the endogenous measurement model
Matrix of coefficients for the exogenous measurement model
Vector of errors of latent variables
Residual vectors of the observed variables in the endogenous measurement model
Residual vectors of the observed variables in the exogenous measurement model
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The normalisation in (6) to X3 (operating profit)
is important insofar the 11 coefficient from (8) will
measure the effect of the firm size normalised to its
profit and subsequently measured in the same metric
as the operating profit. Therefore, the structural effect
of the latent firm size to the latent re-investment
variable will have the same sing as the individual
effect offirm's profit to its re-investment behaviour.
Corresponding to the specification in Eqs. (6-8),
the coefficient matrices are given in Table 9. We
estimate the coefficients from Table 9 by minimising
the log-likelihood expression given in Eq. (4) where






1 0 0 ~3A = o -x 'A(x) 0- 0 0 0 ~441
'A(x) 0 0 0 0 ~551
'A(x) 0 0 0 0 0 ~661
[A;"] [&1 J0E= ~ c2 r=(Yil)'A<Y) 031
(6-8). The estimation was based on the correlation
matrices S calculated from the data (Tables 4-7). Full-
sample estimation by minimising Eq. (4) using the
full information maximum likelihood (FIML) proce-
dure produced results reported in Table 10 (standard
errors are in the parentheses).
The estimated coefficients seem well determi-
ned and statistically significant. The 11 coefficient is
0.29 and significant, hence the firm's size affects
significantly its investment behaviour; on average
larger firms indeed re-invest higher share of their
profit. The fit of the model is acceptable with the
overall fit 2 of 46.59 (d.f. = 26). Other fit statistics also
indicate approximately good fit (Table 11). There-
fore, we reject Hot and conclude that enterprise size
does have a (positive) effect on re-investment share.
1.27 (.14)
0 .85 (.13)
0 0 1.50 (.15)o -0- 0 0 0 1.91(.18)
0 0 0 0 1.31(.14)
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Table 11
Goodness of Fit Statistics
Statistic Test value P-value
Minimum Fit Function ~l(26) 46.59 0.01
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares X2 45.58 0.01
Root Mean Sauare Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.06 0.32
Nonned Fit Index (NFl) 0.91 -
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) 0.94 -
Parsimony Nonned Fit Index (PNFI) 0.66 -
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.96 -
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) 0.96 -
Relative Fit Index (RFI) 0.88 -
Standardised RMR 0.05 -
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.93 -
Adiusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) 0.55 -
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) 0.55 -
Next, we estimate difference between groups of
firms of different sizes and sectors, hence test the
multigroup hypotheses H02 and 1103' We estimate the
multigroup models multi group LISREL framework.
Specifically for our application, we can test three sets
of hypo theses, either jointly or separately: x(l) = x(2) = =
}6), (I) = (2) = = (6) and (I) = (2) = = (6), where the numbers in
the superscript denote treatment group. Note that the
control group is also included as number one treat-
ment (thus there are 6 groups). Formally, the testing
proceeds by specifying a multigroup model ofEq. (2)
with group (treatment) specific subscript i, i.e.,
The multi group multivariate Gaussian log like-
lihood function is a sum of group-specific terms in the
form
InF; = - ~j Inll:;1 + tr(S;l:~l) (12)
The hypothesis of overall equality of covariance
matrices can be tested by the Box-M test which is
given by
k:
M =N.lnISI- LN; .lnIS;I- X2«k-1)(p+1)p/2) (13)
;=1
where k is the number of groups and p is the number of
variables (i.e., the analysed covariance matrices are of
dimension prp. In respect to specific multivariate
structure of the analysed matrices, iftheyare found not
to be overall identical we can test for the equality of the
number of factors and equality of the model parame-
ters. Particularly, as already mentioned, we can test for
and for by minimising the likelihood function given in
Eq. (12) with and without the equality constraints
which allows computing a likelihood ratio statistic and
formal hypothesis testing.
The addition oflatent means in the Eq. (11) re-
sults with inclusion of additional parameters and the
model becomes with an additional assumption that.
The model with means requires zero means restri-
ctions on the latent means parameters in the reference
group (e.g., control treatment) in order to be identified
and thus group or treatment means measure deviations
from the reference group means. The means-structure
model assumes factorial invariance (i.e., invariance of
the measurement model) across different groups. In
the typical experimental design applications this as-
sumptions precludes the effect of particular treatments
on the inter-relationships among variables allowing
merely different effects on means. This type of ceteris
paribus assumption is thus problematic in a relatively
large class of experimental treatment applications.
The multi group LISREL estimation allows for
more detailed analysis then generally required in
experimental forestry research. Namely, it allows
analysing in more detail covariance structures within
each treatment group as well as testing for structural
differences across groups. A relevant use of multi-
group estimation for our purpose is to check whether
the model from which we computed the latent scores
holds approximately in each treatment group, but it
additionally allows us to investigate treatment effects
on the covariance structure of the measurements and
their inter-relationships which might differ both
across treatments and across time.
Estimation of the model (6)-(8) produced the
results shown in Tables 12 and 13. It appears that the
effect of the latent firm size (normalised to operating
profit) is of higher magnitude in the production firms
sub-sample while in the service sector sub-sample this
effect appears insignificant according to its estimated
standard error.
The general differences in terms of the estimated
model between the two sub-samples were tested by
estimating a multigroup model which resulted with a 2
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of353.89 (d.f. = 71), hence the production and service
sector firms differ significantly in terms of their
model-implied covariance structures. It thus follows
that the model differs between production and service
groups and hence the sectoral belonging does playa
significant role in the re-investment behaviour. We
thus reject HOl noting that positive effect between firm
size normalised to its profit and its re-investment
latent variable is only significantly positive for the
production sector firms.
Further to the single-group analysis performed
above, we estimate a multigroup model with groups
of small, medium, and large firms. Separate estimates
for each group are shown in Tables 14, 15, and 16. The
estimates of the structural parameter (11)' while positi-
ve, is insignificant for large firms, while significant
for medium and small firms. While the magnitude of
11is largest for the medium firms (0.93) the estimated
standard error is 0.46, while for the small firms the
estimate is 0.59 with standard error of only 0.19.
Finally, we analyse differences between produ-
ction and service sector firms in the sub-sample of
small firms which, with N = 168, is large enough to
allow multigroup estimation. The maximum like-
lihood coefficient estimates in each group sub-
sample are shown in Tables 17 and 18. Similar to the
results obtained above for all firms, the results for the
small firms indicate significant difference between
production and service sector firms with the multi-
group 2 of282.72 (d.f. = 71), which rejects equality of
all parameters. The estimates of the II coefficient are
0.62 for the production sector firms and 0.44 for the
service sector firms, with standard errors 0.29 and
0.24, respectively. Therefore, the magnitude of the
effect is again much higher for the production sector
firms, which is indicative of the positive link between
the firm's profit and re-investment share for the
production sector firms, or lack of such link for the
service sector firms.
6. Conclusion
Regional fiscal policy measures such as profit-
tax reductions aimed at stimulating investment in un-
Table 13
Coefficient estimates (all firms: service sector, N = 139)
Table 14































0 0 1.53 (.36)o -15-
0 0 0 1.85 (.40)
0 0 0 0 1.42 (.35)
0 0 0 0 0 1.46 (.35)

























r = (0.15 (.26»)
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Table 15
Coefficient estimates (medium firms, N = 90)
1.21 (.54)
1.42 (.59)









0 0 1.59 (.37)o -5-
0 0 0 1.92 (.41)
0 0 0 0 1.20 (.33)





r = (0.93 (.46»)1.22 (.38)
o
Table 16
Coefficient estimates (all small firms, N = 136)
1.25 (.27)
1.46 (.30)









0 0 1.56 (.19)o -5-
0 0 0 1.84 (.21)
0 0 0 0 1.25 (.17)









Coefficient estimates (small firms: production sector, N = 54)
1.13 (.38) 1.27 (.30)
1.27 (.41) 0 1.08 (.28)
0 0 1.43 (.32)
A = o -x 0.43 (.31) 5 0 0 0 1.90 (.37)
1.10 (.38) 0 0 0 0 1.31 (.30)
1.20 (.39) 0 0 0 0 0 1.19 (.29)
[1.10 (34) J [1.02 (.33)
1.18(.32J
A = 1 0E= 0 1.19 (.32) r = (0.62 (.29»)y
1.00 (.32) 0 0
28 CROATIAN lNTERNA TIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
Table 18





0 0 1.65 (.24)o -0
0 0 0 1.81 (.25)
0 0 0 0 1.22 (.23)
0 0 0 0 0 1.45 (.23)












r = (0.44 (.24))
BIBLIOGRAPHY
derdeveloped regions rest on the assumption that hig-
her after-tax profit will result in higher re-investment
share which, in turn, will stimulate growth and regi-
onal convergence in economic development. How-
ever, it questionable whether the extra profit due to
smaller profit tax will be re-invested, saved or consu-
med. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the relation-
ship between profit and investment is the same for
firms in production and service sectors and for the
firms of different sizes. We analyse this issues on the
example of the Croatian war-affected (underdevelo-
ped) regions and find that, on average, policy of profit
tax reductions might be effective as the higher is the
after-tax profit, the higher will be the re-investment
share. However, we find differences between the
production and service sectors where significant po-
sitive relationship between after-tax profit and invest-
Archibald, G.C. (1967), Regional Multiplier Effects in the U.K.,
OxjordEconomicPapers, 19(1), 22-45.
CzinIky, D. (2004a), LlSREL 8.54: A program for structural equation
modeling with latent variables, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 19,
135-141.
Cziraky, D. (2004b), Estimation of Dynamic Structural Equation
Models with Latent Variables. In: A. Ferligoj and A. Mrvar (Eds.),
Developments inApplied Statistics, 22 (forthcoming).
Cziraky, D., Filipan, T. and Pisarovic, A. (2002a), Multivariate
modelling in experimental design. In: Ferligoj, A. and Mrvar, A. (Eds.),
Developments in Applied Statistics,19.
CzinIky, D., Puljiz, J., Jur1in, K., Malekovic, S. and Polic, M. (2002b),
Covariance Structure Analysis of Regional Development Data: An
Application to Municipality Development Assessment, in Bade, v.,
Heinrich, H., Brauser, H.L. (Eds.), From Industry to Advanced Services:
Perspectives of European Metropolitan Region. Dortmund: European
Regional Science Association.
Cziraky, D., Puljiz, 1., Jurlin, K., Malekovic, S. and Polic, M. (2002c),
A Multivariate Methodology for Modelling Regional Development in
Croatia, Croatian International Relations Review, 8(25), 35-52.
Cziniky, D., Sambt, J., Rovan, 1., and Puljiz, J. (2003a), Regional
ment exists for production firms, but lacks for the
service sector firms. The general policy conclusion,
therefore, would be to consider a differential treatment
of production and service sectors, thereby allowing for
higher profit tax reductions for production firms then
for the service firms. In fact, we find no support for
profit-tax reduction policy targeting service sector
firms, hence higher tax revenues while still stimulating
regional development and growth could be achieved
by introducing lower profit taxes for only production
sector firms.
Our ftndings are generally limited by the small
sample sizes and possible measurement error in the
data. The obtained results, nevertheless, indicate that
similar analysis should be done on a larger sample,
which would ultimately allow stronger policy conclu-
sions and recommendations. •
development modelling: A structural equation approach, European Journal
of Operational Research (underreview).
CzinIky, D., Tisma, S. and Pisarovic, A. (2003b), Determinants of the
low SME loan approval rate in Croatia: A latent variable structural equation
approach. Small Business Economics Journal (forthcoming).
Cziraky, D., Sambt, J., Rovan, J., Puljiz, J., Polic M. and Malekovic, S.
(2003c), Regional development assessment using parametric and non-
parametric ranking methods: A comparative analysis of Slovenia and
Croatia. Proceedings from the 2003 European Regional Science
Association conference (R-sessions). Jyvaskyla: ERSA.
Gillman, M. and CzinIky, D. (2004), Money Demand in an EU
Accession Country: A VECM Study of Croatia. Bulletin of Economic
Research (under review).
Hewings, GJ.D. (1978), The Trade-Off between Aggregate National
Efficiency and Interregional Equity: Some Recent Empirical Evidence,
Economic Geography, 54(3), 254-263.
Hutton, 1.P. and Hartley, K. (1968), A Regional Payroll Tax, Oxford
Economic Papers, 20(3), 417-426.
Kesselman, J.R., Williamson, S.H. and Berndt, E.R. (1977), Tax
Credits for Employment Rather Than Investment, TheAmerican Economic
Review, 67(3), 339-349.
JANUARY - JUNE 2004 29
NOTES
1 Namely, general tax reductions aimed at specific region cannot alone
assure desired effects. Their effectiveness depends on characteristics and
behaviour of the enterprises in the targeted areas, primarily their tendency
for profit-share re-investment. It is widely believed, for instance, that
Croatian service sector re-invests smaller profit-share then the industrial
sector and thus larger after-tax profit is mainly spent on consumption
expenditure thus having no effect on economic development and growth.
Indirectly, however, reduced government's income from profit taxes will
shrink budgetary capabilities to provide underdevelopment subsidies and
thus indirectly negati vely affect development of these areas. Gillman, M.
and Cziniky, D. (2004) give a macro-level empirical study of Croatia,
however micro-level bas not be empirically investigated.
1 Special focus is on the existing tax reductions for business entities in
the war-affected regions in Croatia focusing and enterprise characteristics
and behaviour, especially profit-reinvestment tendency. An additional as-
pect that needs investigation concerns the effects of enterprise character-
ristics on investment behaviour specially profit re-investment tendencies.
1 The policy aspects mainly concern the issue of how to fiscally treat
enterprises of different sizes and the question of whether there are any
sectoral and regional differences requiring special considerations.
1 Hutton and Hartley (1968) referred to UK's Midlands and South-East
as developed areas.
1 United Kingdom is the best example of a country where employment
premium was used in practice.
1 Regional employment tax credits were used, e.g., in Italy, Sweden,
Finland, and Germany. A version of employment tax credits with a noted
training incentive was also introduced in the USA under the Job
Opportunities in the Business Sector AIDC Work Incentive Program.
1 A criteria for tax reduction can be based on the amount of man-hours
increased over some specified based such as a last year figure or a related
measure of firm's historical performance.
1 The sensitive information generally concerns total profit and turnover
figures which will be obtained from the FlNA agency that has legal
authority to collect such information on behalf of commercial banks
formally in charge of the system of payments.
1 Note that the unitary actor hypothesis holds closely for the small and
medium enterprises - decisions are in principle made by the owner of the
SME, i.e., the "entrepreneur".
1 Zhu (2002) is a recent example of analysis that treats variables such
as total expenditures as not direct! y observed, i.e., latent
1 SMEs, for example, invest little in R&D and marketing but across
different sectors there are also large differences (relative to total investment
magnitudes) in the type of investments actually made by SMEs. From the
econometric point of view, we must allow for varying variances of parti-
cular investment categories and unequal influence on the (latent) total in-
vestment. Finally, it is straightforward to test the two alternatives statistically
and accept or reject the latent measurement model of investment in favour
of simple additive investment, i.e., perfectly measured and directly observed.
